Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, they have been proven to be a powerful class of attacks, with an easy to achieve fault model. One of the main benefits of SIFA is to overcome detection-based and infection-based countermeasures. In this paper we explain how the principles of SIFA can be applied to GIMLI, an authenticated encryption cipher participating the NIST-LWC competition. We identified two possible rounds during the intialization phase of GIMLI to mount our attack. If we attack the first location we are able to recover 3 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 8 key-bits organized in 3 sums using 180 ineffective faults per biased single intermediate bit. If we attack the second location we are able to recover 15 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 22 key-bits organized in 7 sums using 340 ineffective faults per biased intermediate bit. Furthermore, we investigated the influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults in GIMLI. Finally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means of simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fault attacks span a class of implementation level attack which were first introduced by Boneh et al. in their seminal work [2] . Fault attacks pose a serious threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. They usually aim for a modification of the processed data or the control flow in order to reduce the underlying mathematical problem to a simpler one. The most common type of fault attack is the Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) which requires knowledge of multiple faulted encryptions and a correct one. Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA), as introduced by Dobraunig et al. [6] , requires only an intermediate state with a biased distribution i.e. a distribution which deviates from the uniform distribution. Also, in contrast to Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) it is not necessary to have tuples of faulty and correct encryptions. Even worse, SIFA can break traditional countermeasures against fault attacks like detection-based or infection-based countermeasures. State of the art: So far the priciples of SIFA were applied to a variety of cryptographic algorithms ranging from block ciphers as AES [6] to authentificated encryption schemes like KETJE, KEYAK [5] and ASCON [11] . Contributions: We present the first SIFA on the NIST-LWCcandidate GIMLI. Additionally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means of simulation. In addition, we evaluate the influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults. Organization: The rest of the work is structured as follows: Section II introduces authenticated encryption and the NIST-LWC competition. Section III explains the principles of SIFA. Section IV presents the NIST-LWC candidate GIMLI. Section V introduces our SIFA on GIMLI. Section VI provides the results of our proposed attack on GIMLI.
II. NIST LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY
With the growing amount of interconnected devices, the need for secure communications is ubiquitous. While today's cryptographic algorithms are well suited for high-end computing, like servers, or desktops, their performance degenerates dramatically, when implemented on small, resource-constrained devices. Therefore, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched an open standardization project for lightweight cryptography in 2013 [8] . In 2019, the tremendous amount of 57 round 1 submissions confirms the need and interest of lightweight cryptography. NIST focuses on small, but secure algorithms that provide both Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) and Hash. Additional features like post-quantum resistance or ease of side-channel and fault-attack resistant implementations are desirable, but not mandatory. In this paper, we will focus on AEAD: Authenticated Encryption (AE) combines the traditionally separated cryptographic primitives symmetric key cryptography and authentication into one single algorithm. Additionally, in AEAD, Associated Data (AD) is authenticated, but not encrypted. This is particular useful for header information in a communication protocol that must be authenticated, but do not need to be encrypted. If the authentication of either the AD or message fails, an empty string is output, otherwise the plaintext is released. This prevents chosen ciphertext attacks. Fig. 1 shows the inputs and outputs of an AEAD scheme (encryption). Formally, let k, ν, t ≥ 1, K ∈ {0, 1} k denote a secret key, N ∈ {0, 1} ν a nonce, AD ∈ {0, 1} * associated data, M ∈ {0, 1} * a message, T ∈ {0, 1} t an authentication tag, and C ∈ {0, 1} * a ciphertext. An AEAD is a triple Π = (K, E, D), with a key-generation procedure K that returns a random K, an encryption algorithm E K (N, AD, M ), and a decryption algorithm D K (N, AD, C, T ), where E outputs a pair (C, T ), and D outputs either the plaintext M or the void symbol ⊥ if the tag is invalid:
The exploitation of statistical ineffective faults was first proposed by Dobraunig et al., in order to break symmetric cryptography [6] . SIFA can be seen as the combination of Ineffective Fault Analysis (IFA), as proposed by Clavier and Christophe [3] , and Statistical Fault Analysis (SFA) as proposed by Fuhr et al. [7] . In the following, the principles of SIFA are explained.
A. Background
SIFA combines the benefits of IFA and SFA in terms of the required fault model, the key distinguisher and the ability of overcoming countermeasures: The required fault model of IFA, is rather specific e.g. Clavier et al. proposed a fault model where the computation of an XOR results always in a zero value [3] . The downside of the assumed fault model is the fact that the required fault model is difficult to achieve in practice. In contrast, the assumptions of the required fault model for a SFA are loose as the only requirement for a successful SFA is a biased intermediate state as shown by Fuhr et al. [7] . Both attacks differ significantly in how they recover the key: In IFA the recovery of the correct target partial sub key is strictly analytical; whereas in SFA a statistical approach is used. One of the main benefits of the statistical approach, in SFA, is the immunity to noisy faults i.e. injections that do not comply with the required fault model. The main benefit of ineffective faults is the ability to break common countermeasures against fault attacks. There are two possible countermeasures against fault attacks: detection-based countermeasures and infection-based countermeasures [6] . The most common form of detection-based countermeasures is temporal redundancy, where an encryption or decryption is performed twice. If the results do not match, a fault occurred and appropriate measures like a system-reset can be taken. The infection-based countermeasure applies additional operations in order to increase the fault propagation to an level where an attack is no longer feasible [9, 13] . IFA is based on a very precise fault model where a faulted operation always returns the same value in the general case. By forcing the output of an operation to a specific value, the attacker can distinguish, if the output of the faulty operation is equal to the fault free output. If the faulted output equals the fault free output, an ineffective fault occurred. 
The elements of the diagonal of an FDT correspond to the probabilities for different ineffective faults as shown in Eq. (2).
We assume the FDT is not known to the attacker. Nevertheless, it is still possible to exploit the diagonal's deviation from the uniform distribution. Since we assume the presence of a detection-based countermeasure, or an authenticated decryption like GIMLI-decrypt (which inherently provides the required filtering), we will state the statistical model explicitly for this scenario. Here, the attacker has only access to samples where the intermediate values under attack fulfill S = S . Under the assumption, that S is uniformly distributed with P(S = s) = 2 −n = 1 |S| , the rate of ineffective faults r ineff can be calculated as shown in Eq. (3).
The diagonal of the FDT can be expressed as conditional distribution as shown in Eq. (4). This distribution is later estimated by an attacker, as neither the diagonal nor S can be observed.
However, it is possible to calculate the hypothetical distribution p H of S H under the assumption of a fixed key hypothesis k H . By using the correct key guess k H the correct distribution p ineff (s ) = p H=correct (s ) is observed. In order to distinguish it from incorrect key guesses, we assume that all distributions of incorrect key hypotheses k H=wrong are close to the uniform distribution i.e. p H=wrong (s ) ≈ θ(s ) = 2 −n . The distinguisher D(p H ) is used to rank the key candidates according to their distance to θ(s ). The chi-squared (χ 2 ) test as introduced by Pearson [10] , is used to calculate a metric for the difference of two probability distribution function a and b, both with values x ∈ X and N samples as shown in Eq. (5)
Since incorrect key guesses follow the uniform distribution, we can use the χ 2 metric to distinguish distributions resulting from the correct key hypothesis p H=correct and a uniform distribution θ caused by an incorrect hypothesis. This leads to the χ 2 -distinguisher as shown in Eq. (6) .
Alternatively, a scaled version of CHI, the Squared Euclidean Imbalance (SEI) [12] as shown in Eq. (7), can be used.
Where N denotes the number of observed decryptions under the influence of ineffective faults.
IV. GIMLI GIMLI is a suite of cryptographic primitives based on the GIMLI-permutation by Bernstein et al. [1] . It participates in the NIST lightweight cryptographic project for authenticated encryption and hash. In this paper, we focus on the GIMLI-CIPHER, a family for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). 
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A. The Gimli-permutation
The GIMLI-permutation is based on an a 384-bit-state. As shown in Eq. (8), the state is defined as a 3×4 matrix: the rows are named a, b, c; the columns are enumerated 0, 1, 2, 3; the round is denoted by r. For example a 11 1 denotes to the second 32 bit word before the execution of the 11 round.
Algorithm 1 describes how this state is permuted in 24 consecutive rounds. They are enumerated in reverse order: a permutation starts with round 24 and ends with round 1. During each round, the state is first substituted and permuted (SP-Box). Every second round, the state is mixed linearly (alternating either a small swap or a big swap). Finally, every fourth round, a constant is added.
The GIMLI-CIPHER is a sponge based AEAD scheme with a 128 bit rate and a 256 bit capacity. The rate matches a, the capacity matches the concatenation of b and c. Fig. 3 depicts the four phase during an AEAD. As the exploited fault is ineffective in respect to the output, the exact behavior of the AEAD scheme is secondary and a brief description of the four phases is sufficient: First, the state is initialized with a 128 bit nonce, and the 256 bit key as depicted in Eq. (9).
Nonce:
Second, the associated data AD i are absorbed in blocks of 128 bit. Subsequently, the message block key s i is squeezed. Depending on the mode, either the ciphertext C i = M i ⊕ s i or the plaintext M i = C i ⊕ s i is generated. In any case, next, the plaintext M i is absorbed. Finally, the tag is calculated. Between all phases and absorbed blocks the GIMLI-permutation is invoked. Incomplete blocks are padded. Additionally, there is a domain separation between the processing of AD, the processing of plaintext, and finalization. For decryption, the tag is not output, but compared to the received tag. If both tags match, the plaintext is released, otherwise, the empty string is output.
V. SIFA ON GIMLI
We target the decryption of GIMLI because AEAD schemes only release the plaintext if the computed tag matches the original tag. This behavior can be exploited to distinguish between effective and ineffective faults, as an effective fault results in a tag mismatch.
A. Fault Injection Location
For the SIFA on GIMLI we evaluated different locations where an induced ineffective fault can be exploited. Similar to the attacks on Ketje and Keyak [5] , we use the nonce and a hypothesis of the target partial subkey k H to calculate an intermediate value of GIMLI. In general, this is possible for any intermediate value during the decryption of GIMLI. However, in order to reduce the number of involved keybits of the intermediate value and the number of hypotheses N H , it is desirable to attack the early rounds of the first GIMLI-permutation. Fig. 4 shows an attack mounted during the initialization phase. When we target the first GIMLIpermutation, we can choose from one of the 24 rounds. The Substitution Permutation Box (SP-Box) of the GIMLIpermutation poses the best attack target, due to the involved non-linearity. A possible position to inject an ineffective fault into the SP-Box is colored red in Fig. 5 . We mount the attack on a biased b r , however a similar reasoning can be applied for a biased a r or c r . The attacked round is a trade-off between the number of recoverable key-bits n keybits and number of possible key hypotheses N H . The earlier the attack, the simpler are the equations for the intermediate values, but also fewer key bits can be revealed. The later the attack, the higher is the number of involved key bits n keybits and thus, more hypotheses N H must be checked. The number of hypotheses N H grows exponentially with the number of involved key bits n keybits as shown in Eq. (10) .
In order to determine the exact number of involved key bits b k the dependencies of an intermediate value must be traced back to the initialization phase where the state gets initialized using the known nonce and the unknown key.
B. Calculation of Intermediate Values
The dependencies of an intermediate value under attack are related to the fault injection location. We will demonstrate an attack of bit b r 0,7 . Hereby b r 0,7 denotes the seventh bit of the word b 22 0 during round r. The resulting dependencies of b r 0,7
with respect to the according injection location are shown in the second row of Table 2 : Dependencies of b r 0,7 for different injection locations round, i.e. after round 24, to attack the bit b 23 0,7 only affects two key bits and therefore, does not offer a big advantage in terms of recoverable key bit this is shown in the first row of Table 2 . If the fault is injected one round later i.e. after round 23, eleven key bits are involved in the computation of the bit b 22 0,7 this is shown in the second row of Table 2 . By biasing the intermediate bit b 21 0,7 again a round later, an attacker can utilize 37 involved key-bits due to the sheer length of the involved equations we stated the full dependency equation in the Appendix. Involved key-bits lead to a dependency due to the path along which they properagate through the GIMLIpermutation. The bit wise dependencies after each GIMLIround are visualized similarly to Dobraunig et al. [4] . Involved bits i.e. dependencies are represented by a 1 independent bits are represented by '0' or '-' e.g. c=1100 means that only bit 3 and 2 of this nibble are involved in a computation. The position of the key is colored in green and the nonce in blue. Fig. 6 shows, which bits are involved in the computation of the intermediate bit b 22 0,7 which is colored in red. Even though 11 bits of the key are involved in the calculation of the intermediate value b 22 0,7 , not all of them can be identified distinctively due to linear dependencies of the involved key bits. Eq. (11) shows these linear dependencies. Each of the three sums are affected by three different key bits. Therefore, only the sums k s1 , k s2 and k s3 , but not the individual key bits can be recovered.
k s1 = k 0,21 ⊕ k 5,15 ⊕ k 1,6
Thus, an attack on the intermediate value b 22 0,7 reveals only the key bits k 4,29 , k 1,3 and k 1,2 . However, the key sums can also be used to build hypotheses. This results in an advantage of 2 6 compared to brute-forcing each individual bit of the involved key bits. An attack on the intermediate state b 21 0,7 already involves 37 key bits. Taking linear dependencies into account, the number of hypotheses is 2 22 . A graphical representation of the dependencies of b 21 0,7 is shown in Fig. 7 Going one round further (b r=20 0,7 ) increase the number of involved key bits to 168. However, testing 2 168 hypotheses is not feasible in a reasonable amount of time. Thus, the attack on the intermediate states in rounds 22 and 21 offer a reasonable trade-off between the number of hypotheses and recoverable key bits.
C. Fault Model
In Section III the influence of some typical fault models onto the FDT's was shown in Table 1 at the example of a two bit intermediate state. However, the fault models are not limited to 2-bit but can be applied to words with variable width w. Since we cannot choose the word-width of the implementation of GIMLI but still want to evaluate the distribution of a single bit, it is important to evaluate, if a byte based fault model also biases each bit separately. For example a fault of width w = 8 is the equivalent to a byte based fault model. We simulated faults with w = 8 according to the probabilistic bit flip fault model where a flip from 1 → 0 occurs with probability P 1→0 = 2 3 and a flip 0 → 1 with probability P 0→1 = 1 3 . This biased bit flip probabilities for a one bit intermediate value b result in the histogram shown in Fig. 8 This behavior is the same as the FDT shown in Table 1d which depicts the two dimensional case. The bias of the 8-bit intermediate value b r=22 0,0−7 caused by an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 9 . The nearly normal distributed values without any fault are colored in green whereas all values leading to ineffective faults are colored in blue. If one compares the histogram as shown 
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Round 24 (+ Small Swap) in Fig. 9 with the previously introduced FDTs as shown in Table 1 , it becomes clear that this distribution can be attacked due to the deviation from the uniform distribution which is directly recognizable. Based on the simulations as shown in Fig. 9 we decided to use a byte based fault model i.e. w = 8 during the explanation of the attack strategy.
D. Attack Strategy
For the attack it is necessary to generate decryptions under the influence of an ineffective fault. As a result of GIMLI being a AEAD scheme the collected decryptions are all under the influence of an ineffective fault otherwise there would be involves n keybits = 11 but only hypotheses on 6 key bits are required as the remaining key bits only appear in the form of a sum. Therefore, the number of hypotheses N H shrinks from 2 11 to 2 6 . The same effect also occurs when we target the intermediate value at the same position one round later i.e. b r=21 0,7 . The computation of the intermediate state b 21 0,7 involves 37 key bits as shown in the dependency equations in Table 2 . The key-bits k 4,26 , k 4,20 , k 4,5 , k 4,4 , k 4,3 , k 4,2 , k 4,1 , k 1,26 , k 1,25 , k 1,8 , k 1,7 , k 1,2 , k 0,26 , k 0,25 and k 0,18 can be determined uniquely. Furthermore, the sum of 22 key bits in the form of 7 sum can be determined. From the 37 involved key bits we are able to obtain an advantage of 22 bits compared to the brute force effort over the SIFA reveals three candidates with the same SEI after 340 decryptions under the influence of ineffective faults. The ambiguity is caused by some nonce bits that do not differ when they cause an ineffective fault. Although the described ambiguity is present, there is always the correct key-hypothesis among those three candidates. By the injection of 8-bit ineffective fault, hypotheses can be build on 8 intermediate bits that can be evaluated simultaneously with almost no extra computational effort. With this we get an advantage of at most 8 · 6 = 48 bits when attacking round 22 and at most 8 · 22 = 176 bits when attacking round 21. In order to obtain the complete key which is loaded during the initialization phase of GIMLI it is necessary to repeat the proposed attacks with varying intermediate states under attack until all key bits are recovered.
VI. RESULTS
Now that we have clarified the prerequisites for the attack, we will present the results. First we will evaluate the influence of the fault width w on the ineffectiveness rate of the injected faults. Second the obtained results for the attack on b r=22 0,7 and b r=21 0,7 are presented. Both attacks exploit the bias of an ineffective fault with fault width w = 8 bit injected after round 23 respectively 22 under the assumption of a probabilistic bit flip fault model.
A. Influence of fault width on ineffectiveness rate
SIFA exploits the bias present in an intermediate state independently of the assumed fault model. In practice, it is usually assumed that an attacker has no information about the FDT which is caused by the ineffective fault injection. Nevertheless, the only prerequisite for a successful attack is that an intermediate value follows a biased distribution. The biased distribution is indicated by the diagonal of the FDT which follows a non-uniform distribution as shown in Table 1 . Furthermore, we typically cannot choose the target architecture where GIMLI-AEAD is run on, which can either be a software implementation running on a microcontroller or a hardware implementation running on a FPGA or ASIC. If we consider the case of a software implementation of GIMLI-AEAD, then the fault width w will be the same as the word with of the micro-controller. If we consider a hardware implementation of GIMLI-AEAD the fault width w is usually dependent of the implementation. In the following we use the typical fault models random-And, Stuck-at-0 and probabilistic bit-flip exemplary to simulate a fault on a software implementation, the same reasoning can also be applied to hardware implementations. Faults are injected during round 23 of the first GIMLIpermutation on state b r=22 0 . The width w of the fault ranges from 1 to 32 bit with w ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16, 32}. By calculating the number of ineffective faults n ineff divided by the number of total encryptions N we obtain the ineffectiveness rate as shown in Eq. (12) .
The ineffectiveness rate r ineff with respect to the fault width w is shown in Fig. 10 . As one can see the ineffectiveness Figure 10 : Ineffectiveness rate r ineff of different fault models rate r ineff decreases almost linearly with the assumed fault width w. The linear decrease of the ineffectiveness rate occurs independently of the three fault models. The ineffectiveness rate of the probabilistic bit flip fault model is dependent on the assumed bit flip probabilities we decided to use this model to provide a worst case estimation. In practice this means that attacking a 32-bit software implementation of GIMLI, should be feasible according to Fig. 10 . Especially the Random-And model offers a significant rate of ineffective faults at w = 32 bit. However, due to the very low ineffectiveness rate for the other fault models, a number of more than 10 9 total encryptions is required for the attack. For the sake of simplicity further simulations where done with a fault width w = 8 bit in order to minimize the computational effort of generating ineffective faults. is able to retrieve the involved key bits correctly after approximately 180 ineffective faults. The number of required encryptions under the influence of an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 12 where we used the SEI as statistical metric. In Fig. 12 the best wrong hpyothesis is colored red and the correct hypothesis in blue. Furthermore, it is important to notice, that after the point both are crossing line, the correct hypothesis keeps a significantly higher value. Fig. 11 shows the advantage over brute forcing when increasing the number of decryptions with ineffective faults. The maximum advantage is defined as the number of unique definable parameters when attacking the single bit b r=22 0,7 , i.e. the three key-bits and the three sumvalues therefore the maximal advantage of the attack on round 21 can be 6 bit. The unstable advantage at the beginning is caused by multiple key hypotheses with similar SEI values, which leads to frequent change of the key hypothesis having the current maximum SEI. Although the correct key hypothesis is retrieved after 180 ineffective faults, some bits of a wrong hypothesis still are equal to the corresponding bits in the correct guess leading to an advantage of less than 6 bits. is able to retrieve the involved key bits correctly after approximately 340 ineffective faults. Again, the number of required encryptions under the influence of an ineffective fault is shown in Fig. 14 where we used the SEI as statistical metric. In Fig. 14 the best wrong hpyothesis is colored red and the correct hypothesis in blue. Fig. 13 shows the advantage over brute forcing when increasing the number of decryptions with ineffective faults.
The possible advantage when attacking b r=21 0,7 is 22-bits at max. Although the hypothesis with highest SEI changes frequently when using less than 340 ineffective faults, the correct keyguess has the maximal SEI after obtaining it. In this work we presented the SIFA of the AEAD scheme GIMLI (GIMLI-24-CIPHER). Furthermore, we investigated the influence of the fault width w on the rate of ineffective faults r ineff . The fact that SIFA can be applied to the AEAD scheme GIMLI should be considered a threat. This is mainly due to the fact that the fault model assumed by SIFA is rather simple to achieve i.e. a biased intermediate value which is processed during a cryptographic operation. Due to the ineffective characteristic common countermeasures against fault attacks can be circumvented by SIFA. c r=23 0,14 = n 0,22 ⊕ k 4,13 ⊕ (k 4,12 & k 0,3 ) b r=23 0,05 = k 0,28 ⊕ n 0,13 ⊕ (n 0,12 | k 4,4 ) a r=23 0,19 = k 5,19 ⊕ k 1,10 ⊕ (n 1,24 & k 1,7 ) ⊕ c 19 b r=23 0,2 = k 0,25 ⊕ n 0,10 ⊕ (n 0,9 | k 4,1 ) a r=23 0,14 = k 5,14 ⊕ k 1,5 ⊕ (n 1,19 & k 1,2 ) ⊕ c 14 ; c r=23 0,05 = n 0,13 ⊕ k 4,4 ⊕ (k 4,3 & k 0,26 ) c r=23 0,04 = n 0,12 ⊕ k 4,3 ⊕ (k 4,2 & k 0,25 ) b r=23 0,27 = k 0,18 ⊕ n 0,3 ⊕ (n 0,2 | k 4,26 ) D. b r=21 0,7
-key sums Key bits which can only recovered in the form of a sum are colored in blue.
